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NO. 26 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
Deadlock in Georgia 
Political Crisis and Regional Changes Need an EU Response 
Franziska Smolnik, Mikheil Sarjveladze and Giorgi Tadumadze 
Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia’s government and oppo-
sition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by 
the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering par-
liament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over 
Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While Russia and 
Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been 
barely visible. For Georgia, which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have 
clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western 
course. Tbilisi continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a 
geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political 
crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neigh-
bourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic 
orientated Georgia. 
 
On 6 January 2021 Georgia’s then-Prime 
Minister Giorgi Gakharia announced that 
the country would be applying to join the 
European Union in 2024. In October 2020, 
the deputy chairman of the Georgian 
parliament, Kakha Kuchava, had already 
confidently stated that Georgia would be 
ready for this step in 2024. The develop-
ments of recent weeks and months, how-
ever, have raised grave doubts within the 
EU. Georgian politics was burdened for 
more than 18 months by the mutual ani-
mosity between the governing party, Geor-
gian Dream, and the political opposition, 
in particular the former ruling party United 
National Movement (UNM). Since the par-
liamentary elections of 31 October 2020 – 
which the opposition has decried as fraudu-
lent – the controversy has blown up into 
a national political crisis. This is primarily 
evidenced by the fact that a large majority 
of the elected opposition candidates are 
boycotting parliament. 
The Georgian government’s public an-
nouncement of its intention to apply for 
EU membership comes at a time when the 
political crisis in the country has further 
rigidified. This reveals a number of con-
clusions about the current state of EU-
Georgia relations, and especially the chal-
lenges they face. Two aspects in particular 
need to be taken into account when evalu-
ating the current relationship: domestic 
politics and its interaction with foreign 
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policy, and the embeddedness of the rela-
tionship in the regional context, which is 
currently being reconfigured. 
Domestic Political Stalemate 
A Catalyst for the Crisis 
If not its origin, then at least a substantial 
catalyst of the current stalemate between 
government and opposition were the Geor-
gian parliamentary elections of autumn 
2020. Georgian Dream officially won the 
elections, with a total of 90 of the 150 seats. 
The United National Movement took second 
place, with 36 seats. Voting occurred over 
two rounds: the first by proportional repre-
sentation, the second by majority voting. 
Since all opposition parties boycotted the 
second round, however, Georgian Dream 
ran on its own. While international election 
observation missions assessed the elections 
as competitive and concluded that funda-
mental freedoms had been preserved over-
all, local watchdog organisations noted 
substantial deficits and irregularities. Since 
the opposition views the results as fraudu-
lent, its representatives have refused to 
accept their mandates as a protest. Accord-
ingly, on 11 December 2020 only the 
elected representatives of Georgian Dream 
took up their parliamentary activities. Since 
then, the opposition has been lambasting 
the “one-party parliament”. In its turn, the 
ruling party has condemned the boycott as 
a deliberate attempt by the opposition to 
destabilise the country. Six elected opposi-
tion parliamentarians have now dropped 
the boycott and entered parliament, but the 
vast majority are standing by their refusal. 
The current dilemma not least points 
to debates about what the parliament’s re-
sponsibilities should be, and about insuf-
ficient parliamentary oversight. A lack of 
experience in effectively implementing 
oversight mechanisms has contributed to 
preventing a sound parliamentary culture 
and practice from fully taking root. While 
there have been reforms in recent years 
aimed at strengthening parliamentary over-
sight, these did not provide a clear enough 
definition of the role of the opposition. This 
has raised the question of how effective 
mutual institutional oversight is. 
The crisis was exacerbated by the arrest 
on 23 February 2021 of the UNM Chair Nika 
Melia. The public prosecutor accuses him 
inciting and leading mass violence at street 
protests in 2019. The opposition has casti-
gated the procedure as politically motivat-
ed. Giorgi Gakharia resigned as prime 
minister over the arrest; he appears to have 
been unable to impose his own view within 
Georgian Dream that arresting Melia would 
lead to further political escalation. How-
ever, there are also structural challenges 
behind the current crisis. 
Structural Challenges 
The Judiciary: Permanently under 
Construction 
Among the most important campaign 
promises made by Georgian Dream in 2012 
was the slogan “restoring justice”. Beyond 
moral and political justice, this referred 
to the judiciary, which had been heavily 
politicised and dependent on the executive 
under the UNM government. Nine years 
have passed, but the politicisation of 
jurisprudence continues to be one of the 
greatest challenges facing Georgia in terms 
of the division of powers. According to 
organisations such as the national offshoot 
of Transparency International, Georgian Dream 
came to an informal agreement before the 
2016 parliamentary elections with the so-
called Clan, a group of influential judges. 
This informal deal on mutual support, so 
Transparency International claims, has 
allowed the group of judges to extend its 
influence over the whole judiciary and 
given the executive greater access to the 
former. Georgians’ lack of confidence in 
the judiciary is likely to be another conse-
quence: according to a 2019 poll, only 
5 percent of respondents had entire con-
fidence in the courts. Fifty-three percent of 
those questioned believed that the courts 
were being influenced by the governing 
party. 
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For the executive, influencing the judici-
ary has been an effective tool for decades 
for pushing through its political and spe-
cific agenda, and not just under Georgian 
Dream. This is precisely what the opposi-
tion currently accuses the government of in 
the case of Nika Melia’s arrest. Georgia’s 
ombudswoman, Nino Lomjaria, also criti-
cised the court’s decision: arresting Melia, 




The second and key domestic challenge for 
Georgia is the extreme polarisation of Geor-
gian politics and media. An electoral system 
that favours the “winner takes all” principle 
has so far reliably led to election winners 
primarily being concerned with consolidat-
ing their own power, to the detriment of an 
effective implementation of the division of 
powers. In turn, this has intensified the 
confrontation between the governing party 
and opposition parties, which have mobi-
lised their respective constituency (and thus 
parts of society) against each other. In gen-
eral, the prevalent political culture in Geor-
gia has not been conducive to integrative 
principles and processes, such as a readi-
ness to compromise and accommodate, the 
establishment of coalitions, or the division 
of powers. 
Structural causes for this political polari-
sation can be found above all in the party 
landscape. Many parties tend to concern 
themselves only with benefiting from the 
political events of the day without pursuing 
long-term strategies and programmes. They 
are often hierarchical and not organised 
in particularly democratic ways. The two 
largest and best-resourced parties in the 
country, Georgian Dream and the UNM, 
have tried especially hard to turn the polar-
isation to their advantage. By presenting 
their respective opponent as the enemy 
and promoting this image, each has tried 
to position itself as the only option in the 
party competition. For several years, the 
two parties thus left little room for alter-
native forces to emerge. 
Georgian Dream has long been domi-
nated by the billionaire and former prime 
minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili; the UNM by 
the former president Mikheil Saakashvili. 
Their respective rhetoric aims to give their 
party a monopoly in the political process. 
Both have thus intensified the political dis-
cord in recent years. 
Social media also act as tools of polarisa-
tion and radicalisation of the political spec-
trum and at least part of the electorate. 
Political actors use them as platforms to 
spread disinformation about their political 
rivals. Moreover, the country’s most impor-
tant television channels tend to act as 
mouthpieces of specific political groups. 
Their reporting is not aimed at objectivity 
but instead at popularising the political 
agenda and purposes of political camps. 
TV channels are by far the most significant 
source of information for political news 
and thus shape public opinion to a large 
extent. 
Domestic Controversy and the EU 
The domestic confrontation also affects the 
relationship between Georgia and the EU. 
For over 15 years, pursuing integration in 
Euro-Atlantic institutions has been a fun-
damental orientation of Georgia’s foreign 
policy. Since it came to power in 2012, 
Georgian Dream has continued its prede-
cessors’ foreign-policy course. Georgia and 
the EU have been linked through an Asso-
ciation Agreement as well as a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 
since 2016. In 2017 the objective of ob-
taining EU and NATO membership was 
written into the Georgian constitution. The 
reforms required to implement the associa-
tion agreement implicate a wealth of policy 
areas and domains. The agreement’s Pre-
amble states from the outset that shared 
values such as democracy, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights are the foun-
dation stone of the association, and that 
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Georgia is committing to implementing and 
strengthening them. 
Currently, however, Brussels views the 
deficits in Georgia’s justice system and its 
political polarisation as the main challeng-
es to any further rapprochement. In the 
EU’s most recent report on implementing 
the association agreement, it calls for fur-
ther efforts in these areas. 
A Prominent Role for the EU 
The political crisis in Georgia also has a 
more specific impact on its relationship 
with the EU. In early 2020, after an elector-
al law reform had failed in the Georgian 
parliament, several Western embassies 
offered space for talks aimed at finding a 
compromise between the governing party 
and the parliamentary opposition. Today 
embassies of the EU, EU member states and 
the US are again active as facilitators. After 
the parliamentary elections of October 
2020, they once again brought the conflict 
parties together for negotiations at the 
latter’s request. It is hoped that they will 
end with a compromise. 
However, this is a tightrope walk for 
the EU’s representatives, who risk getting 
caught up themselves in the showdown 
between the governing party and opposi-
tion, and being viewed, or turned into, a 
part of the domestic Georgian row. In mid-
December 2020, for instance, the UNM and 
circles close to it made accusations against 
Western diplomats. The then UNM Chair-
man, Grigol Vashadze, named these allega-
tions as one reason for his subsequent with-
drawal from the party. In early February 
2021 the EU ambassador attracted the dis-
pleasure of Georgian Dream. He had criti-
cised one of its members of parliament for 
making public the phone number of a 
journalist known to be close to the UNM, 
calling the act a violation of data protec-
tion. Members of the European Parliament 
felt compelled to issue a joint statement to 
signal their support for the ambassador. 
In response to criticisms by the chair of the 
foreign affairs committee of the Lithuanian 
parliament, the new Georgian Prime Minis-
ter Irakli Garibashvili, moreover, declared 
on 22 February 2021, the day that his 
appointment was confirmed, that such 
outside interference was unacceptable.  
  
From Facilitation to Mediation 
Yet the EU plays an ever more important 
role in Georgia’s domestic controversy. 
During a visit to Georgia in early March 
2021, the President of the European Coun-
cil, Charles Michel, conceded that it was 
time to move from mere facilitation to 
active mediation. After his visit, Michel and 
the High Representative Josep Borrell ap-
pointed Christian Danielsson, from Sweden, 
to be the Personal Envoy and travel to 
Tbilisi for mediation purposes. The US em-
bassy continues to participate in these talks 
too. Alongside the issues of whether to call 
new elections and release Melia, they are 
likely to revolve around reforming the 
justice system and electoral law, strength-
ening parliamentary oversight and identi-
fying any potential for de-polarisation. 
After two rounds of mediation ended with-
out the parties reaching a compromise – 
and after a strongly worded statement by 
leading MEPs that failure to do so will 
reflect on future EU-Georgia relations – 
Brussels is currently mulling its next steps. 
Regional Reconfigurations 
The turbulence in Georgia’s domestic poli-
tics coincides with significant changes in 
the neighbourhood. In the autumn of 2020, 
the escalation of the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh between Georgia’s neighbours 
Armenia and Azerbaijan put an end to the 
status quo that had existed for 26 years. 
Azerbaijan retook large swathes of territo-
ries that had been under Armenian control 
since 1994. Since the trilateral agreement of 
10 November 2020 between Baku, Yerevan 
and Moscow, Russian peacekeepers have 
been stationed in the conflict zone. The 
armed confrontations also set in motion, or 
reinforced, a process of regional reconfigu-
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ration in which Russia and Turkey in par-
ticular play a prominent role. How exactly 
the balance of power between the two re-
gional powers in the South Caucasus stands 
or might develop is one of the most heavily 
discussed issues regarding the 44-day war. 
Observers largely agree, however, that the 
conflict made clear the deficiencies and 
weaknesses of the EU’s toolbox. Moreover, 
many believe that the EU’s “geopolitical 
commission” has become an empty word, 
especially where its immediate eastern 
neighbourhood is concerned. 
Georgia and Its Volatile 
Neighbourhood 
Georgia is the only country in the South 
Caucasus to have concluded an association 
agreement with the EU and to pursue the 
long-term objective of joining the EU and 
NATO. It faces at least five key changes and 
development prospects in its neighbour-
hood. First, Georgia’s neighbours Russia 
and Turkey have grown in importance for 
its two other neighbours, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, in the context of the escalation 
in autumn of 2020. Second, Georgia per-
ceives a deterioration in its own security 
situation. Since the stationing of Russian 
troops in Azerbaijan, Georgians are very 
sensitive to the fact – not least in light of 
Russia’s increased dominance in the Black 
Sea basin – that their country is now geo-
graphically surrounded by Russian troops. 
Third, Tbilisi faces the question of what 
the consequences might be for Georgia con-
cerning Turkey’s new role in the South 
Caucasus and the development of Turkish-
Russian relations in the region. Fourth, the 
agreement of 10 November 2020 aims to 
reopen regional communication links, 
which have been blocked because of the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict; there are 
debates in Georgia about what impact such 
a reopening would have on its own role as a 
transit country and the future it envisages 
as a regional transport hub. And fifth, the 
strengthening of Russia’s influence in the 
South Caucasus is perceived as a factor that 
could further threaten Georgia’s ambition 
to join the EU and NATO. 
A New Regional Context for 
EU-Georgia Relations 
All of these (potential) changes – as well 
as how they are perceived and interpreted 
locally – also concern Georgia’s relation-
ship with the EU. The EU’s room for ma-
noeuvre in the South Caucasus is dwindling 
while the influence of Russia and Turkey is 
growing. For a long time, Tbilisi has seen 
Turkey as a partner and precursor for Geor-
gia joining the EU and NATO (Turkey being 
a NATO member and candidate for EU 
accession itself). Now, in late January 2021 
Ankara and Tehran suggested a regional 
cooperation platform in the 3+3 format. 
Along with Turkey and the three South 
Caucasus countries, this plans to include 
the regional powers Iran and Russia, but 
not the EU or USA. After the Russian-
Georgian war of 2008, Ankara had already 
opened discussions on a similar regional 
cooperation format, in a 3+2 version, with-
out Iran. This proposal was obviously never 
realised. However, (geo)political conditions 
at the time were markedly different, and 
not only in the region but also in terms of 
Turkey-EU and Turkey-US relations. 
An Imbalance of Supply and 
Demand 
For some time, there have been discussions 
within the region, but more and more often 
also among various actors in the EU, about 
whether the EU can remain relevant to the 
needs of the countries in its eastern neigh-
bourhood. The most recent escalation in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has given 
these debates momentum. Key EU deficits 
cited include its insufficient offers of secu-
rity cooperation and its limited role as an 
actor in conflict transformation. The dis-
cussions also concern Georgia, which faces 
issues of national security and the unre-
solved conflicts with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
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However, there is a certain amount of 
tension between security cooperation and 
engagement in conflict transformation. 
Pushing ahead in both areas is not neces-
sarily compatible. The EU deals with the 
conflicts over the breakaway de-facto states 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia mainly at the 
level of immediate parties in the conflicts 
(Tbilisi, Sukhum/i and Tskhinval/i), whereas 
Georgian actors tend to view the conflicts 
mainly through the prism of Georgian-
Russian relations. Tbilisi considers Euro-
Atlantic integration, ideally including secu-
rity cooperation, a shield against Russia, 
among other things. However, Georgia’s 
closer links with the EU mean that the 
latter is not perceived as a neutral conflict 
mediator in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
As a consequence, the EU has virtually no 
leverage vis-à-vis them. 
Although the EU’s engagement in con-
flict transformation remains limited, it 
has tried – especially following the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war – to expand it. To this 
end, it has created the EU Monitoring Mis-
sion and the EU Special Representative for 
the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Geor-
gia; co-chaired the Geneva Discussions be-
tween the involved parties; and financially 
supported measures for conflict transfor-
mation. Simultaneously, however, the EU’s 
room for manoeuvre in these areas has be-
come more complicated. It has to act in a 
multidimensional conflict setting since 
the conflict between Georgia, the de-facto 
states, and Russia is unfolding on several 
levels. The fraught relationship between the 
EU and Russia also limits the EU’s ability to 
make an impact. 
Yet the current domestic political crisis 
in Georgia is not conducive to Georgian 
politicians finding their own constructive 
policy approaches. This is also true for deal-
ing with the de-facto states, among other 
things. At the moment, it appears that 
attempts to set (foreign) policy objectives 
are being impeded by domestic politics or 
specific power interests. Evidently domestic 
controversies tie up so many resources that 
it lowers output. It is therefore neither in 
Georgia’s nor in the EU’s interests to let the 
current situation become permanent. 
Prospect 
Both the domestic political crisis and the 
changing regional environment are chal-
lenges for EU-Georgian relations. The EU is 
actively engaged in the domestic dispute at 
the highest level via Charles Michel, likely 
a consequence inter alia of criticism heard 
especially in recent months that the EU is 
not sufficiently present in its eastern neigh-
bourhood. This commitment is therefore a 
positive sign. The majority view in Georgia 
seems to confirm this, as instanced by state-
ments by political actors and NGO repre-
sentatives as well as the reporting in signif-
icant media. 
However, this form of participation by 
EU representatives and EU member states in 
an associated partner country once again 
raises a number of overarching concerns. 
These include how local conflict resolution 
mechanisms might be lastingly strength-
ened, what the ownership of the reform 
process is, and what the symmetry or asym-
metry is in EU-Georgian relations. 
The EU takes on risk by becoming an 
actor in the domestic confrontation, and 
trying to help offset the deficits of Georgia’s 
political system at least in the short term. 
Such an engagement does not automatical-
ly lead to the creation of locally embedded 
offset and conflict resolution processes. It 
does not necessarily pave the way for the 
sustainable prevention of future crises. 
Moreover, if the EU does not live up to ex-
pectations, that may also have a negative 
impact on its credibility in the eyes of both 
the local elite and the Georgian people. The 
EU’s mediation activities are thus already 
being considered a litmus test for its overall 
importance in the neighbourhood. What-
ever the outcome of the mediation may be, 
the EU should continue its visible interest 
in Georgia’s development beyond this pro-
cess – merely selective attention could 
turn out to be counterproductive. 
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The EU has always emphasised that it is 
in Georgia’s own interest to implement the 
reforms decided in the association agree-
ment, since it is the country and its people 
that will benefit first and foremost. This 
should be true in many respects but does 
not do justice to the substantial imbalance 
in power between Brussels and Tbilisi, or to 
the added value that a rapprochement be-
tween Georgia and the EU would have for 
the latter. Rather, the emphasis on its part-
ner’s self-interested goals glosses over the 
fact that the EU also gains when countries 
in its immediate neighbourhood accept a 
large part of the EU acquis – without even 
any current prospect of EU membership. 
When the Georgian government announced 
that it would be applying for EU accession 
in 2024, it was likely intending, inter alia, 
to give the laborious process of “becoming 
EU-like” a concrete objective. The EU should 
therefore not be content to limit its engage-
ment in Georgia to the aim of reaching a 
compromise to end the domestic political 
deadlock. Beyond this, Brussels should 
reflect on the potential for future relations, 
taking into account its partners’ expecta-
tions and needs. The EU’s credibility and 
actorness in its eastern neighbourhood 
depends not only on its own estimation of 
its achievements, but also on how partner 
countries perceive and value its actions. 
The differences in the two sides’ expecta-
tions – for instance concerning security co-
operation, engaging in conflict transforma-
tion, and a strategic vision for cooperation 
– are problematic. And this is not a prob-
lem that will solve itself, even though the 
EU may not wish to fully regard it as such; 
after all, it is providing extensive financial 
support. Given the regional changes, rela-
tions between Georgia and the EU could be 
strained not only by the domestic crisis in 
Georgia but also by this “expectation gap”. 
Put more positively: both issues make it 
urgent for the EU to act to give its relations 
with Georgia new impetus and new drive. 
A wealth of ideas and proposals is al-
ready on the table. Inter alia, they spring 
from the broad consultation process that 
the European Commission undertook in 
2019 with a view to adjusting the Eastern 
Partnership beyond 2020. Many of the pro-
posals can be found in the conclusions of 
the Eastern Partnership Council of 11 May 
2020: strengthening shared ownership, 
and a made-to-measure (i.e. differentiated) 
bilateral cooperation; concentrating more 
on common foundations, such as democra-
cy, the rule of law and good governance; 
agreeing on milestones and monitoring 
mechanisms so as to structure the process 
more clearly and more transparently; 
making better use of conditionality; and 
expanding cooperation in security matters 
and conflict transformation. 
It is not, then, a lack of ideas that is pre-
venting the EU from expanding its commit-
ments in its eastern neighbourhood. The 
fact that the last regular summit of the East-
ern Partnership took place in 2017, and 
that the date for the meeting intended for 
this year has still not been set, rather indi-
cates a lack of strategic interest on its part. 
The timing of the Georgian government’s 
announcement about its plans to apply for 
EU membership can therefore also be seen 
as a summons to the EU. The Union should 
take this opportunity to rethink its long-
term role in the region, and to develop a 
new strategic vision for its relations with 
countries there – first and foremost those 
which are decidedly pro-EU and pro-NATO, 
such as Georgia. Otherwise the EU runs the 
risk of continuing to lose its appeal in the 
region. 
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